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The current era is an era of information where consumption, usage and manipulation of
information is made easy by the use of computers and computer networks. Computer net-
works and digital informations have become a precious asset for various organizations, for
example, e-commerce websites, government agencies, defense sites and growing indus-
tries. These networks are vulnerable to attacks, as today’s attackers are well equipped, and
with their advancing abilities in this field, there is an increased necessity to protect these
networks and websites.
Network intrusions and network attacks have increased recently on major sites and
networks; for example, major attacks have been launched on NATO, U.S. DOD, Pentagon
and the white house. The safeguard and security of these networks and sites are becoming
a very important and critical issue. As the technology and technical abilities of hackers
are increasing and becoming more sophisticated, it is necessary to develop an effective
intrusion detection system and intrusion prevention system which is more robust and more
efficient in identifying and preventing these attacks. In the early 1980’s and 1990’s attacks
like Denial of Service (DOS) and Sniffer were considered infrequent, but today a successful
DOS attack can put any e-commerce or other retail sites out of business. Safeguarding these
sites and networks is becoming more difficult and thus requires an advancement in the field
of intrusion detection.
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1.1 Intrusion and Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion is any set of action that attempts to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or
availability of the resource [14]. An intrusion detection system is something that would
identify these attacks and generate reports that would alarm the network administrator to
take suitable action against the intrusion, which could be either strengthening the firewall
or avoiding further occurrence of such attacks. If the intrusion detection system is properly
deployed, it will play an important role in indicating whether the system is under attack
or identifying any breach in the security [1], thus protecting the network against possible
threats.
1.1.1 Types of Intrusion Detection System
There are various types of intrusion detection systems (IDS) [28] [1]. Based on the infor-
mation source, IDS are classified as follows:
• Network based IDS: This uses network packets as the data source. The network
adapter are used to monitor and analyze the traffic in real time. It uses various detec-
tion techniques to analyze and recognize the attack type. Once the attack is detected
appropriate actions are taken by the network administrator like terminating the TCP
connection, blocking particular IP packets by reconfiguring firewall and saving evi-
dence to avoid further occurrences of such attacks [1]. Network based IDS includes
wireless network monitoring and network analysis [28] [29].
• Host based IDS: The IDS mainly uses security logs and information gathered through
a monitoring system, events and system logs. An intrusion is detected by analyzing
these logs and regular checks for unexpected deviations from what is set as regular
activity. A counteraction is taken, if an attack is detected, by either terminating the
user login or disabling the account [1] [28] [29].
Based on the method of analysis IDS [11][12] are classified as follows:
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• Anomaly based IDS: In anomaly based intrusion detection system the normal behav-
ior of the user or group of users are monitored and recorded. A proper knowledge
base is created for such normal activity. Anomaly based IDS identifies action that
strays too far from normal behavior and alarms an intrusion to the administrator [12]
[20] .
• Misuse based IDS: In misused based intrusion detection system the activities are
recorded. These activities are compared with the known behavior of attackers and
if there is a close match or the match is above the threshold then these activities are
identified as intrusion [1] [10] [9] [11]. The IDS alarm the system for the attack and
it’s the responsibility of the network administrator or intrusion protection system to
take the appropriate counter action.
1.2 Approaches to IDS
The major approaches to IDS are outlined below:
Data Mining: There are various techniques to create an effective intrusion detection
system. In the data mining approach we collect a large quantity of network data and audit
data to find normal usage patterns. In case of anomaly detection, any deviation from the
normal usage pattern should raise an alarm, and, in the case of misuse, we use audit data
for encoding and matching with known intrusion attacks [4].
Machine learning (Artificial neural network) : Neural network is a growing technique
in the field of intrusion detection. Neural network based intrusion detection is mainly clas-
sified as memory based and memory free. Memory based neural network is when we train
the network with absolutely error free data (anomaly detection). Once the training is com-
plete if the input data set does not match the k-nearest neighbor or a pre-trained neuron
the data is assumed to be anomalous and an alarm is raised. For the other case (misuse
detection) the neural network is trained with all types of intrusion attack data. The neural
3
network is trained for these different attacks using their known patterns and signature. If
any data matches with any of these signatures, the alarm is raised for intrusion [4]. There
are more IDS approaches available like specification based, computer immunology, ab-
straction based intrusion detection; automatically build intrusion detection model, colored
petri net model and information theoretic measures [4].
1.2.1 Advantages of using Neural Networks for IDS
The nature of attacks changes constantly. The linear mapping or rule based approach for
intrusion detection is not enough to make a powerful network intrusion detection system.
We require a flexible system which could analyze the huge network data more efficiently
and accurately. Neural network could be a very effective approach to intrusion detection as
it analyzes the data in a less structured way. It posses the ability to analyze the information
from different network sources in nonlinear fashion which is a key factor in identifying such
changing attack patterns [10]. Moreover, neural networks will provide the flexibility that
any network would require. Network data or network information collected from different
sources might be incomplete, unclear, inconsistent or distorted. The neural network is
capable of learning such patterns and is also capable of analyzing data even though the
data is unclear or distorted.
1.3 Deficiencies with Current methods and Proposed Hybrid Approach
The current neural network based intrusion detection is considered to be an efficient ap-
proach in classifying patterns but they require extensive computation and time consuming
training. Training requires large amount of data which hinders most of its applications
which stands true for its use in intrusion detection applications as well [21]. For example,
an attack would be difficult to detect, if the attacker removes all its information from the
system immediately after the attack, and since there will be no information to train the
network for such kind of attack. Therefore, we would want to get the information about
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the attack before its too late. Another issue with current neural network is assigning initial
weights to neural networks which is an unresolved problem. Experiments conducted in
1998 showed different initial weights can give different results [18]. For these reasons we
need a better IDS that could provide better support to existing firewalls and show better
ability in identifying intrusions with more accuracy and fewer false positive and false neg-
ative rates [20]. The current misuse based IDS does not effectively identify a new attack in
real time, which is another major issue.
In this thesis, we present a Hybrid network intrusion detection system which is not only
faster but also accurate. The intrusion detection system is based on the CC4 algorithm
developed by Kak [2][6] that can detect attacks instantaneously and helps resolving the
initial weight assigning issues of neural networks. The instantaneously trained CC4 neu-
ral network [2] operates alongside a two-layer feed-forward neural network given by The
Mathworks. The two-layer feed-forward backpropagation neural network identifies pattern
with more precision once it is well trained and give a very low false negative and false
positive rate and better accuracy. Thus the two IDS helps to create a hybrid IDS that is not
only faster, but also provides higher accuracy in detecting known and unknown attacks in
real time, and gives lesser false positives and false negatives rates. The hybrid system uses
the instantaneous training and detection ability of the CC4 neural network to identify new
signatures, i.e. detecting unknown attacks in real time. Detection of new attacks in real
time helps creating a more robust and better intrusion detection system. The hybrid system
does not just detect whether incoming network packets belongs to an intrusion or a non
intrusion type but it also detects the respective class of attack.
The rest of the document is divided into three sections: The next chapter gives a de-
tail description of the underlying neural networks with a brief description of the intrusion
dataset used for validating our approach. Chapter 3 describes the hybrid system and the
simulation of its components. Chapter 3 also includes the results and findings. Chapter 4





Intrusion detection system is an active area of research. Many approach and techniques
have been used to design an effective intrusion detection system The most common tech-
nique is the one using data mining and machine learning technique. Our thesis is focused
on machine learning based approach. In 1998, a neural network based intrusion detector
was proposed by Ryan J., Lin M.J. & Miikkulainen R. [12] which identified intrusions
based on the distribution of commands used by the user. This was an anomaly based in-
trusion detector. This system was divided into three phases; the first phase was to collect
data from the audit log from different users for some period and construct a vector from the
collected data to represent the command execution distribution from each user. The second
phase is to train the network to identify these users based on these distribution vector and
if the system identifies any significant deviation from normal behavior it was signaled as
intrusion. In 1998, J. Cannady [9][11] proposed a misuse based IDS which was mostly
to filter data from incoming packets for suspicious events. The data is send to expert sys-
tem or to a stand alone neural network application for identifying intrusions. The final
result was a two class identifier which detects normal and attack patterns for 89-90% of
the cases. Further work has been on misuse based intrusion detection system using feed
forward neural network and back propagation training algorithm by M. Moradi and Mo-
hammad Zulkernine in 2004. They proposed an offline trained neural network approach
which would detect known attacks with 91% of accuracy, here the novel attacks were not
taken into consideration. There are lots of work done on unknown attack patterns recogni-
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tion as well [9] [11] [12] [24] mostly based on anomaly based intrusion detection, i.e. by
identifying activities which substantially defer from normal, as intrusion. A hybrid system
was proposed by Stefanos Koutsoutos, Ioannis T. Christou and Sofoklis Efremidis in 2006
[23] using artificial neural network and rules based matching system to detect known and
unknown network intrusions. They used outputs of net pattern classifier and system call
classifier to make the decision whether to raise an alarm for intrusion or not. Both the neu-
ral network required good amount of training to detect the attacks. The experiment showed
good results for known attack and they were able to detect novel attack with an accuracy
of 80%. A similar work has been done by John Zhong Lei and Ali Ghorbani in 2004 [25]
to simulate neural network based hybrid IDS which used Self Organizing Map (SOM), an
unsupervised training algorithm to identify unknown attack by clustering the connection
based on their similarities and a improved competitive learning method to identify known
attacks.
Most of the work done is based on offline training of neural network and are mostly
ineffective in real time detection of novel attacks. The simulation of neural network based
IDS requires complex computation and time consuming training which hinders its real time
unknown pattern recognition capability. In our thesis we have used CC4 - instantaneously
trained neural network as a replacement to the existing more common neural network to
detect unknown attack patterns. The hybrid system we proposed handles the three possible
type of input: normal, known attacks with classified individual classes and unknown attacks
in more effective way.
2.2 CC4 Neural Network
The CC4 neural network is an instantaneously trained neural network proposed by Kak in
1992 [6]. The instantaneously trained neural network is an attempt to model biological
short term memory or the working memory. The amount of information the short term
memory can hold is limited but can be extended by grouping such information [5]. The
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corner classification network is based on the visio-spatial sketchpad and phonological loop
[6]. The concept of radius of generalization was introduced in CC3. The hamming distance
was used for classification between binary vectors, i.e. any test vector whose hamming
distance is smaller than the radius of generalization of the network is classified in the same
output class as that training vector [6]. A unique neuron is associated with each input vector
and all hidden neurons are completely connected to the neurons at input layer. Each node
in the network acts as filter for training samples to get the desired output. The algorithm
called Corner Classification technique, as a hyper plane (the filter) is used to separate the
corner of n dimensional cube by the training vectors [3].
The CC4 algorithm consist of three layered feed forward network, namely, Input Layer,
Hidden Layer, and Output Layer, with binary neurons which uses threshold logic as the
activation function. The input layer requires input to be in unary format which makes the
algorithm faster but hinders the applicability of the algorithm. Number of element in in-
put vector determines the number of neuron input layer. Each input neuron corresponds to
unique input vector, hence the input neurons is the sum of the range of the input vector. In
addition to this neuron there is a bias neuron which always takes input as 1. The hidden
layer contain hidden neurons which is connected to all the neuron in input layer. Each hid-
den neuron correspond to a single neuron in the training set. Therefore the size of hidden
neurons is equal to the size of the input vector. The output layer contains output neurons
which is equal to the minimum bits required to represent the output in the dataset in binary.
The output layer is also fully connected to the hidden neuron [8].
The weights on hidden neurons are assigned by using the training sample itself. There
can only be two possible values an input neuron can receive. Hence if an input neuron
receives a 1, the weight between the hidden and input neuron is set to 1 else it is set to -1.
There is an extra input neuron called a bias neuron. The weight between bias neuron and
hidden neuron is computed as r-s+1 where ’s’ is the number of 1’s in the input vector of the
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Figure 2.1: General Structure of CC4 Neural Network [26] [5] [ 3] [ 8 ]
training sample and ‘r’ is the user specified radius of generalization. Similarly the weights
between the hidden neuron and the output neuron are set to 1 or -1, but here we assume
there is no extra bias neuron[2] [8]. The activation function for both hidden neuron and
output layer for CC4 network is the binary step function given as [2][8]
y =
{
1 if x[n] > 0
0 otherwise
(2.1)
The CC4 algorithm can be summarized as below [2][8]
Y = f(f((x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, ..., xN , 1)×W )× U) (2.2)
The CC4 algorithm is as follows
for each training vector xk [n] do
sk =no. of 1s in xk[1:n-1]; // x = number of input vector
for j =1 to n-1 do
if xi[j] = 1 then
wi[j] = 1;





wi[n] = r-si+1; // r = radius of generalization
// s = number of 1s in input vector
for k=1 to m do
if yi[k] =1 then // Y = number of bit in desired output.
ui[k] = 1;
else




Basic CC4 Algorithm [5]
The working of CC4 algorithm can be explained using following example.
XOR Function: The CC4 neural network can be used to evaluate XOR function. The
table 2.1 show the truth table of XOR function. As explained above input layer will have 3
input neuron which include 2 logic input and one neuron whose values is calculated as ” r-
s+1” as explained above. Since the truth table show 4 input vector therefore the number of
hidden neuron will be same as the number of input vector and are connected to one output
neuron in the output layer [3].
The three layers of CC4 neural network are fully connected [3]. Each input vector is
presented to network. The input interconnection weights are assigned as the sum of the
product of each input element of the input vector with its corresponding interconnection
weight elements. In this example input vector (1 0 1), where first two ones are the logic








Table 2.1: XOR Truth Table
the weight vector of hidden neuron is given as (1 -1 0) and thus using both input vector and
weight vector of hidden neuron we can determine the total input to the hidden neuron ( 1
* 1) + (-1 * 0) + (0 *1) = 1. The other hidden neuron will receive 0 or negative as input.
Similarly the input for all hidden neuron based on other input vector and corresponding
weight vector are determined. Similarly the weights of output layer and weights of hidden
layer can be used to determine the final output. Radius of generalization, r, is set as zero as
it is of no use in this example [3].
Input to Hidden Neuron Output of Hidden Neuron Input output
Input s Weights H1 H2 H3 H4 H1 H2 H3 H4 Y Y
0 0 1 0 -1 -1 1 1 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 -1 0
0 1 1 1 -1 1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 -1 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 1 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 -1 0
Table 2.2: CC4 network parameters for XOR Function
The operation of CC4 network i.e. its mapping of input to output is shown in table 2.2.
There are other neural network techniques available but their learning rate and speed of
pattern recognition is not real time i.e. other techniques are time consuming and requires
substantial training. The CC4 networks performance is better with respect to both general-
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Figure 2.2: General structure of a CC4 neural network for XOR Function [8] [3] [5]
ization of network and training speed. The speed is extremely fast, thus helping the neural
network to identify various possible intrusions real time. The CC4 neural network is fast
but has certain limitations as it takes input in unary format only.
2.3 Two Layered Feed Forward Neural Network
The other neural network which we have used in our neural network based instantaneous
intrusion detection system is a two-layer feed-forward network developed by The Math-
works popularly known as Matlab neural network toolbox. In our thesis, we are calling the
two-layer feed-forward neural network based IDS as MLP based IDS just to shorten the
name. This is a network with sigmoid neurons and linear output neurons. The network will
be trained using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm [13] and the performance is measured
using mean squared error algorithm.
The flow diagram for two-layer feed-forward network neural network is shown in figure
12
2.4 [27].
Figure 2.3: Flow Diagram of a two-layer feed-forward network Neural Network [27]
The working of the two-layer feed-forward network Neural network can be demon-
strated by simulating a simple XOR function. The truth table of XOR is shown in figure
2.1. In this example we have 2 input neuron at the input level of two-layer feed-forward
network neural network. Each neuron takes one binary value as input and has one output
neuron at the output layer. We don’t have an input layer. Input level is not considered as
input layer because no processing takes place at this level, it just acts as a buffer, hence
this neural network architecture is termed as two layered feed forward network [17]. For
simulation of XOR function we are using newff() to create a new feed forward network
and train() function to train the network. Train function is an inbuilt Matlab function which
uses Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm for training. The network is simulated using the sim()
function.
13
Input Output TestInput TestOutput
0 0 0 0 0 4.640e-12
0 1 1 0 1 1.0000
1 0 1 1 0 1.0000
1 1 0 1 1 1.1883 e-12
Table 2.3: Two-layer feed-forward network Network: Values at Input and Output Neuron
for XOR Function at Epoch=50
2.4 Intrusion Dataset
The data used for this experiment are the benchmark data collected by the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1998. It was collected by the Lincoln Lab-
oratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1998. The Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining (KDD) dataset consist of different input cases of various attacks as well as
normal network packets. We have used subset this dataset for training and testing the two
respective intrusion detection system. There are 22 different intrusions signatures available
which include signatures for Back, BufferOverflow, LoadModule, MultiHop, Guesspass-
word, R2L, U2R, Portsweep, warezClient, warezMaster, FTPWrite, Rootkit, Nmap, Smurf,
Satan, Spy, Pod, Imap, Perl, PHF, TearDrop, IPSweep and Normal (legitimate TCP packet).
There are 4900000 simulated records and each record has 41 different attributes. These 41
attribute network data features are labeled and shown in table 2.4.
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Label Network Data Feature Label Network Data Feature
A duration L logged in
B protocol type M num compromised
C service N root shell
D flag O su attempted
E src bytes P num root
F dst bytes Q num file creations
G land R num shells
H wrong fragment S num access files
I urgent T num outbound cmds
J hot U is host login
K num falied logins V is guest login
W count AH dst host same srv rate
X srv count AI dst host diff srv rate
Y serror rate AJ dst host same src port rate
Z srv serror rate AK dst host srv diff host rate
AA rerror rate AL dst host serror rate
AB srv rerror rate AM dst host srv serror rate
AC same srv rate AN dst host rerror rate
AD diff srv rate AO dst host srv rerror rate
AE srv diff host rate AF dst host count
AG dst host srv count
Table 2.4: Network Data Feature Labels.
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CHAPTER 3
HYBRID INSTANTANEOUS INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
3.1 Problem Specification and goals
The major problems with current intrusion detection system is speed of detection and the
accuracy of detection while detecting both anomalies and misuse attacks. False positives is
when a detected intrusion is in fact not an intrusion, a false negative is when the attack is
detected as a non attack. The current misuse based intrusion detection systems are effective
against known attacks but are mostly ineffective against novel attacks (previously unknown
attacks). Moreover, the current intrusion detection systems are less effective with real time
detection of unknown attacks, as most neural network misuse based IDS are not trained
for identifying unknown attack patterns. The current misuse based IDS gives an incorrect
class type, when it encounters a new pattern. It is difficult to detect whether an abnormal
behavior is a new attack or a known behavior with lots of variation. In this thesis we
try to overcome the above mentioned issues with current misuse based intrusion detection
systems through a more effective hybrid instantaneous intrusion detection system.
3.2 Intrusion Dataset Evaluation
The 41 attributes shown in table 2.4 fields signifies the signature of a particular attack.
22 attributes out of 41 related to the connection and remaining 19 attributes describe the
connection to the same host in the last two seconds [21]. We have analyzed the signa-
tures of different intrusion types, in search for fields that would least contribute in uniquely
identifying a class of an attack. The purpose of analyzing these fields is to reduce the com-
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putational efforts of the training algorithm as each field is involved in matrix multiplication
and adds to the computational complexity. The method that we have used for analyzing is
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [19]. PCA is used when we have obtained the num-
ber of variables and variable have certain redundancies. PCA is used to develop a smaller
number of artificial variable. We had an input vector the 41 different variable as listed in
table 2.4 and we used PCA to see if we could reduce the redundant variables which are
correlated and contribute least to determining the class of attack.
Figure 3.1: Column Value and Column- Distribution Plot for 17 different Intrusion Signa-
ture
Figure 3.1 shows the Attribute value vs the columns, this weight distribution plot is
obtained by testing sample inputs of 17 different intrusion attacks on the Matlab PCA
tool. It can be observed from the figure that column 7-22 has sparse significant value.
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The value of these six features (land, urgent, num failed logins,num shells, is host login
num outbound cmds) are mostly zero [21], but when we carefully analyze individual signa-
tures we came to the conclusion that all fields makes significant contribution. For example
in case of Śpyáttack’s signature, column 7-22 makes a significant contribution, thus we
cannot filter out these columns. Moreover, there are various other attacks whose signatures
are still unknown and these columns may have a significant effect on their detection. Srini-
vas Mukkamala & Andrew H. Sung, in 2002 [20] did a performance metric evaluation on
the data vector which ranked these features into important, secondary and unimportant fea-
tures based on the some tested rules [20]. The algorithm evaluates every input node based
on following 5 class. These classes contains three categories {Important},< Secondary>,
(Unimportant) and columns numbers are distributed accordingly.
• class 1: {1,3,5,6,8-10,14,15,17,20-23,25-29,33,35,36,38,39,41},
<2,4,7,11,12,16,18,19,24,30,31,34,37,40>, (13,32)
• class 2: {3,5,6,23,24,32,33}, <1,4,7-9,12-19,21,22,25-28,34-41>, (2,10,11,20,29,30,31,36,37)
• class 3: {1,3,5,6,8,19,23-28,32,33,35,36,38-41}, <2,7,9-11,14,17,20,22,29,30,34,37>,
(4,12,13,15,16,18,19,21,3 )
• class 4: {5,6,15,16,18,32,33}, <7,8,11,13,17,19-24,26,30,36-39>, (9,10,12,14,27,29,31,34,35,40,41)
• class 5: {3,5,6,24,32,33}, <2,4,7-23,26-31,34-41>, (1,20,25,38 )
Every network incoming packet is compared with these classes and based on the results, the
best suited class and its features are used for training, validation and testing. Evaluation of
every input vector against these classes increases the computational overhead and hinders
its real time applicability. Therefore all these reasons for our simulation we are not filtering
any of the attributes out.
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3.3 Proposed Approach
The IDS we propose in our thesis is a hybrid intrusion detection system which uses neu-
ral network machine learning approach for intrusion detection because of its advantages
of pattern matching, pattern recognition and speed of detection. The hybrid intrusion de-
tection system uses anomaly based and misuse based analysis for detecting unknown and
known intrusion attacks respectively. The hybrid system which we propose is based on two
different neural networks which are different in their learning speed and pattern recogni-
tion characteristics. The two neural networks are the CC4 instantaneously trained neural
network proposed by Kak in 1992 [6] and a simple two layered feed forward neural net-
work, available in MLP . The data used for this experiment are the benchmark data used by
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)[16]. Figure 3.2 shows the basic
architecture of the proposed hybrid intrusion detection system.
Figure 3.2: Basic Architecture of Hybrid Intrusion Detection System
The Hybrid intrusion detection system consists of three major component CC4 IDS,
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MLP IDSs, and the Post Processing Unit. Each of these components have a specific role.
The idea behind using two different IDS is to use the advantages of their underlying neural
networks. The advantage of using CC4 based IDS is its property of instantaneous train-
ing and generalization which does not require a lot of training data and the computation is
simple. The instantaneous training helps faster learning of new patterns, which help iden-
tifying known and unknown attacks in real time. We are using the CC4 IDS as an anomaly
based IDS which considers all attacks whose signatures are pre-recorded in a signature
database as known behaviors of attack. If CC4 based IDS encounters any new behavior
which doesn’t match to any of the known behaviors of attacks in the signature database, it
considers that as an unknown attack and raises an alarm for it. The second component is a
two-layer feed-forward neural network ( by MLP ) based IDS which shows better accuracy
than CC4 IDS while detecting known patterns or known attacks when it is well trained. The
false positive and false negative rate is very low for MLP based IDS. We are using the CC4
IDS for only identifying unknown attacks and not for known intrusion detection. This is
because even though its speed of training is faster than the MLP based IDS, its accuracy for
detecting known attacks is comparatively low and gives a higher false negative rate. On the
other hand we are not using the MLP based IDS for unknown attack recognition because
when tested with unknown attack samples MLP based IDS doesn’t recognize patterns as a
new attack. Instead it identifies new attacks as one of the known attacks or in some cases
as normal data, which is not acceptable. Therefore, for these reasons we use CC4 IDS for
unknown attack pattern recognitions and MLP IDS for known attack pattern recognitions.
3.4 Component1: CC4 IDS and its Simulation
We are using the basic CC4 training algorithm for training and evaluating the test data
sample for intrusion. While implementing CC4 based IDS, every attribute in the input vec-
tor has to be separately converted to unary code[8] which is an issue in our case, as the
data which has been collected is a 41 floating point network data (TCPDUMP). Since CC4
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training algorithm accepts only the unary data, the intrusion data is converted into unary
format using quantization mapping. A quantization mapping is a way of lossy compres-
sion; a process of representing a large possibly infinite set of values with a much smaller
set [15]. The quantization mapping we used is shown in the table 3.1 below. The table
shows the mapping of the different floating point values into their respective unary value.
When observed the dataset in detail, we found the most of the network data lies more or
less in these particular range. This range covers all the data values possibly present in the
intrusion dataset. We decided to use these range based on the density range of 41 inputs
values. The maximum value in the dataset for attributes is 0.6 and minimum is 0. Based on
the 41 attributes values in entire dataset we came with following data range and mapping
which actually helps distinguish between attacks signature in a better way. The range is
not regular but its based on the concentration on attribute values which lies with the given
range. We can have a regular range of data for better accuracy with known attacks detec-
tion but this irregular range give us better results while distinguishing between known and
unknown signatures of attacks. This supports our sole purpose of identifying new attacks
signatures more prominently. The conversion of real floating point network data to 410
unary values input vector and comparison of 410 bit output with all the available signa-
tures adds approx. 0.9 seconds to computation and output generation of every input packet.
Adding for the neural network to generate its output the total time is 3.4 seconds. This is
for a 4.0 GB of memory and i5 core processor with a speed of 3.33 GHz system with Linux
operating system (Fedora).
Each input for training and testing the CC4 network will be (41 attributes × 10 quan-
tized bits) unary data and the output for training is either 0 or 1 based on the inputs, network
weight and learning algorithm. These converted unary data will now be in the same format
as that of the signatures of different intrusion attacks. The CC4 network size increases as
the different class of training sample increases and so the performance of a single network
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Figure 3.3: Regular Range Mapping




0.00000001 - 0.0000001 0000000001
0.0000001 - 0.000001 0000000011
0.000001 - 0.00001 0000000111
0.00001 - 0.0001 0000001111
0.0001 - 0.001 0000011111
0.001 - 0.01 0000111111
0.01 - 0.1 0001111111
0.1 - 0.3 0011111111
0.3 - 0.5 0111111111
0.5 - 0.7 1111111111
Table 3.1: Quantization mapping of floating point data to unary data
handling large network data mitigates. We are using a divide and conquer strategy in a
parallel CC4 network i.e. a chain of smaller CC4 network executing together to reduce the
computation complexity of a single network, which would allow the network to have better
generalization thus resulting in output with lesser error. We are using a parallel chain of
CC4 neural network which has 410 neural network running in parallel, each generating one
bit (0/1) as output per network as shown in figure 3.5.
The result of all these 410 neural networks together will be a match to one of the known
intrusion signature or a legitimate data signature (Normal) and that will be the class of the
input packet. The 410 output one from each of 410 neural network will be compared with
each of the 410 bit signature of a known attack that is pre-saved, for example as shown
in table 3.2, we gave normal network data as input to the CC4 chain and its output is
compared with all known signatures available. Later we calculate the best percentage of
match with all respective signatures of known types which includes signatures of normal
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Figure 3.5: 410 Parallel CC4 Neural Network
data as well. The best match between them will decide whether the input belongs to normal
or a particular class of known intrusion. For example, table 3.3 shows 10 different network
data given as input to CC4 IDS and the output from CC4 IDS is compared against signature
of 7 different known signatures (Smurf, Normal, Satan, Nmap, Neptune, Spy, Waraz) and
based of their best match the class of network packet is decided. In our thesis, the graph
obtained by analyzing the outputs from CC4 IDS is the percentage best match graph.
Figure 3.6 shows the percentage best match graph generated when CC4 based IDS is
tested with 260 different network input data which includes randomly distributed 17 dif-
ferent intrusion types. The CC4 IDS with radius of generalization r=0 is tested for Land,
Bufferoverflow, Pod, Teardrop, Warazmaster, Neptune, Loadmodule, Guesspaswwrod, Smurf,
Rootkit, Nmap, Ftpwrite, Spy, Phf, Perl, Multihop and Warazclient gave a 81.583% accu-
racy. The training and detection time for 410 parallel running CC4 to detect any class of
attack (normal /unknown/ known) is approx. 3.4 sec per signature when simulated on a
system with Linux operating system (Fedora) with 4.0 GB of memory and i5 core proces-
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S No. Network Output Smurf Signature Normal Signature Satan Signature Neptune Signature
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 1 0 0
3 0 1 0 1 1
4 1 1 1 0 1
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 1 1 0
.. .. .. .. .. ..
410 1 1 1 0 0
Table 3.2: Comparising the output from CC4 IDS with all available signatures
Smurf Normal Satan Nmap Neptune Waraz Spy Best Match Attack Type
100 89.97 84.40 93.09 79.28 86.41 85.30 100 Smurf
89.75 99.77 82.18 90.86 85.53 91.75 88.41 99.77 Normal
79.28 85.30 80.62 80.84 100 84.40 81.51 100 Neptune
85.30 88.19 79.06 91.31 81.51 90.86 100 100 Spy
86.41 91.53 79.28 92.42 84.40 100 90.86 100 Waraz
88.41 93.54 81.29 90.42 86.41 97.99 88.86 97.99 Waraz
93.09 90.64 78.84 100 80.84 92.42 91.31 100 Nmap
100 89.97 84.40 93.09 79.28 86.41 85.30 100 Smurf
100 89.97 84.40 93.09 79.28 86.41 85.30 100 Smurf
100 89.97 84.40 93.09 79.28 86.41 85.30 100 Smurf
Table 3.3: Best Match Comparison to Determine Normal/Intrusion type Input
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sor with a speed of 3.33 GHz. The CC4 IDS used an one pass algorithm for training i.e.
the CC4 algorithm, requires one iteration to detect any class of pattern. This instantaneous
training property of CC4 IDS helps in real time identification of attacks.
Figure 3.6: Testing CC4 for 17 different known intrusion type data with r=0
3.4.1 Use of CC4 for Detecting New Attack Signatures
As explained above CC4 generates outputs matching close to one of the known signature
only if the input belongs to one of the known attack classes for which we have a proper
signature. We have set a threshold based on the observation of various simulations that
we have run with various known and unknown type attack as input. Based on the this
threshold we decide whether network has encountered a known or an unknown attack. If
the percentage of best match amongst all known signature falls below this threshold there
is possibility of input belonging to a known type class with lot of variation in it or its a new
attack altogether. We have set 91% and above as threshold and any best match below it will
alarm a signal for the network administrator. We have set 91% as our threshold because
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after multiple simulation runs we found the minimum percentage of the best matches any
input of a known class to a known signature is above 92 % on average. In a simulation the
CC4 neural network was intentionally fed with ”Back” intrusion type attack without any
prior training for it i.e. we are assuming we have a new kind of attack coming through the
network and we don’t have any signature available to identify the exact intrusion type. So in
this case the best match goes below the set threshold and we can indicate the administrator
for abnormal activity of unknown attack type.
Figure 3.7: Best Match Graph of CC4 Based IDS Before Training for Back
Figure 3.7 shows the best match graph that falls below the threshold when the IDS en-
countered a new attack ”Back” thus indicating abnormal malicious activity. The abnormal
input packets are extracted and tested and, if it is a unique signature not seen before, the
CC4 based IDS will update itself with the new signature. The signature database for MLP
IDS which contains the training dataset for the IDS, will also be updated. Figure 3.8 shows
the best match graph of CC4 IDS with proper identification when trained with the new
signatures and tested against the same dataset which we used before the training. The IDS
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now identifies the class of new attack with graph showing all the matches to be above the
threshold percentage.
Figure 3.8: Best Match Graph of CC4 Based IDS After Training for Back
3.5 Component 2: MLP IDS and its Simulation
In addition to the CC4 network we created an intrusion detection system using the two-layer
feed-forward neural network tool that uses the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm to train the
network. The reason behind developing another IDS is due to fact that even though the
speed of training the network using CC4 algorithm is faster than the two-layer feed-forward
neural network, the percentage of accuracy in case of detection is considerably lower and
the false negative alarms are comparatively higher. The MLP neural network tool uses a
two layered feed forward network and utilizes the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm to train
the network. The tool uses the mean square error method to calculate the performance.
The two-layer feed-forward neural network contains 41 neuron at the input level and
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15 hidden neuron at the hidden layer. The neurons at the output layer vary, depending on
the number of known attacks. We have varied the number of neurons at the output layer
depending on our simulation run. Every new signature detected adds 1 to the number of
output neurons. Table show 3.4 shows the output layer with 5 neurons used to train the
two-layer feed-forward neural network for 5 unique signatures.
Record Type Output Vector
Normal 0 0 0 0 1
Satan 0 0 0 1 0
Smurf 0 0 1 0 0
Neptune 0 1 0 0 0
Nmap 1 0 0 0 0
Table 3.4: Output Vector Used for Training and Evaluating MLP IDS
The initial training of the two-layer feed-forward neural network is slow as it takes lots
of iterations to adjust the internal weights. Figure 3.9 shows the accuracy of two-layer feed-
forward after ’1’ epoch or iteration and figure 3.10 shows the accuracy after ’50’ epoch or
iterations. After a substantial amount of training, the accuracy is good and shows less false
positives and false negative rates.
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of data vectors in different subsets for training valida-
tion and testing set.
MLP IDS give inaccurate results, if the MLP IDS is not sufficiently trained with respect
to the number in the training sample. The MLP IDS gives better performance if it has better
a understanding of the patterns it is looking for. In a simulation run, the training dataset
contained 6010 packets, which included 1000 packets each for 6 other attack class and
just 10 packets of teardrop i.e. MLP IDS was trained with 10 training packets of Teardrop
attack. MLP IDS was later tested for its performance to detect the TearDrop attack. While
testing, Due to improper training, instead of detecting the samples as a ’Teardrop’ Attack,
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Record Type Training Set Validation Set Test Set
Normal 1000 1000 50
Satan 1000 1000 50
Smurf 1000 1000 50
Neptune 1000 1000 50
Nmap 1000 1000 50
Table 3.5: Distribution of Data Vectors in Different Subsets used for Training, Validation
and Testing Set
Figure 3.9: Accuracy of MLP IDS after 1 iteration(0% Accuracy)
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Figure 3.10: Accuracy of MLP IDS after 50 iteration(100% Accuracy)
multiple attacks were detected in the sample inputs. Figure 3.11 (a) shows the output of
MLP IDS with multiple attacks detection. Figure 3.11 (b) shows a better performance for
Teardrop attack detection when MLP IDS was fed 1000 samples of the Teardrop attack
while training and tested against the same test dataset which was used before the training.
The accuracy was approx. 100% for this dataset.
MLP based IDS uses the network data in their original form as it does not require
any mapping unlike the case of CC4 IDS. MLP IDS requires a good amount of training
for better performance and it learns gradually with every iteration which requires a large
number of training data and more iterations. Once the training is complete, the accuracy
is very high, with a 92% of accuracy. The false positive and false negative rate is fairly
low if the IDS have well understood patterns of the incoming network packets. The MLP
IDS learns better with more number of samples. The first time training of the MLP IDS
requires good number of iterations. On average MLP IDS took 15-50 epochs to validate the
training dataset of 7000 training samples. The training and detection time of MLP based
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(a) Before Proper Training
(b) After Proper Training
Figure 3.11: MLP IDS Performance Before and After Proper Training
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IDS to detect any class of attack (normal /unknown/ known) is approx. 1.5 - 2.5 minutes
when simulated on a system with windows vista operating system, 4.0 GB of memory and
i5 core processor with a speed of 3.33 GHz. This training time depends on the number of
epochs set for training and the size of training dataset.
The Post Processing Unit will use the output of MLP based IDS to determine the class
of network packet based on known signature for which MLP IDS is trained until and unless
there is no new attack encountered. If a new attack is encountered the CC4 output will be
considered because of its instantaneous learning even with less amount of data and quick
pattern recognition which helps identifying new attacks in real time.
3.6 Component 3: Post Processing Unit
The Post Processing Unit is responsible to determine whether the incoming packet from
the network belongs to normal legitimate class type, a known attack type or a unknown
attack type i.e. a new attack. It use the basic architecture of the hybrid IDS as shown in
figure 3.1 for determining whether packet belongs to normal or known attack class. This
architecture is extended to a hybrid IDS as shown in figure 3.16 to determine the unknown
attack class. The Post Processing Unit will utilize the output from both CC4 IDS and MLP
IDSs to determine the class of incoming packets. he There will be three cases depending
on the class of incoming network packet.
1. Normal Packets: If all the values of the ”percentage best match graph” of CC4 IDS
is above the threshold (91%) and output from MLP IDS shows that the packet belongs to
normal class, the Post Processing Unit declares it as normal packet. Figure 3.12 (a) shows
the percentage best match graph of CC4 for incoming packet of normal class and figure
3.12 (b) shows the output of MLP IDS for packets of normal class, when both IDSs were
tested with the same dataset.
2. Known Attack: If all the values of the percentage best match graph of CC4 IDS is
above the threshold and output graph for MLP IDS shows the packet belongs to one of the
33
(a) Best Match Graph Output of CC4 IDS for Normal Packets
(b) Output of MLP IDS Showing 100 % Accuracy for Normal Packets
Figure 3.12: Post Processing Unit Outputs ”Normal” for Normal Incoming Packets
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Table 3.6: Distribution of Data Vector for CC4 IDS and MLP IDS Test Set
Record Type Training Set Validation set Test Set
Normal 1000 1000 50
Smurf 1000 1000 50
Satan 1000 1000 30
Back 1000 1000 50
Teardrop 1000 1000 20
Neptune 1000 1000 30
Nmap 1000 1000 40
Table 3.7: Distribution of Data Vector in Different Subset for Training, Validation and
Testing Set for MLP IDS
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known intrusion attack classes, the Post Processing Unit declares that this packet belong
to the respective class of attack. Figure 3.13 (a) show the best match graph of CC4 for
incoming packet of Smurf attack class and figure 3.13 (b) show the output of MLP IDS for
packets of Smurf attack, when tested with same test dataset.
3. Unknown Attack: Unknown attacks are identified when output graph of MLP IDS
and best match output graph of CC4 IDS contradicts each other. The hybrid system mon-
itors the CC4 graph carefully for any drop in the best match percentage graph below the
threshold. The CC4 IDS doesn’t give a 100% accurate detection for all attacks if there is a
huge variation amongst two input packets belonging to a same class graph may fall below
the threshold for that particular input case as shown in figure 3.14. After various test run
for CC4 IDS it is observed that the accuracy of correct detection of attack class for CC4
IDS lies between 80-85% if Radius of generalization is set to zero i.e. r=0 CC4 IDS gives
best performance. Radius of Generalization is the term given to classification of input vec-
tor within the Hamming distance from the stored vector as belonging to the same class of
stored vector [3]. Figure 3.15 shows CC4 IDS’s accuracy vs number of intrusions in test
sample at different radius of generalization values. We have kept a waiting time for hybrid
system. The hybrid system waits for 15 inputs packets to make sure whether the fall in the
percentage best match graph is just a huge variation or a new attack altogether. If even after
the wait time the packets show similar behavior i.e. percentage best match graph value for
these packets is still below the threshold percentage (91%), the Post Processing Unit saves
these input packets into the signature database. The signature database is then used as the
training set to train the MLP IDS. We chose to scan 15 input before deciding whether to
save the input packet or not because any attack normally take more than 15 packets to start
an attack and moreover, MLP based IDS gives very low accuracy when trained with less
than 15 data samples for a given attack as explained above in figure 3.11.
The Hybrid system has a backup MLP IDS, MLP IDS-2 as shown in figure 3.16, which
is trained offline whenever the system encounters a new signature or a new attack type for
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(a) Best Match Graph Output of CC4 IDS for Smurf Attack Packets
(b) Output of MLP IDS Showing 100 % Accuracy for Smurf Attack Packets
Figure 3.13: Post Processing Unit Outputs ”Smurf Attack” for Smurf Incoming Packets
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Figure 3.14: Irregularity within packets belonging to Smurf Attack type
Figure 3.15: No. of intrusion Vs Accuracy of CC4 IDS at different ROG
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which the live MLP IDS, i.e. the MLP IDS-1, is not trained for. As mentioned above
there are two cases for which the graph falls below the threshold value. Firstly, when
hybrid system encounters new attack and secondly, when there is a huge variation in packets
belonging to known attack class. The Hybrid system behaves differently for both cases.
Case 1: If the best match percentage graph is still below the threshold value even after
the wait time, the system assumes it’s a new attack and uses the saved signatures from the
signature database to train MLP IDS-2 immediately with the new training dataset which
now includes the signature of new attacks. As soon as MLP IDS-2 updates itself with the
new signatures and start correctly identifying the new attack, MLP IDS-1 will be swapped
with MLP IDS-2 instantaneously without any delay. The network therfore gets protected
immediately, which is our primary concern. Now MLP IDS-2 will go live with its updated
signature and MLP IDS-1 will wait offline until the system encounters an unknown attack
via CC4 IDS. This process is repeated for every new attack found.
Case 2: If the best match percentage graph comes back above threshold value before
the wait time, the hybrid system assumes that the input was just a variation not a new attack
and the system takes no action.
3.7 Comparison of MLP IDS and CC4 IDS
3.7.1 Accuracy of MLP IDS Vs CC4 IDS based on number of Iterations
The behavior of percentage best match graph of CC4 IDS remains unchanged unless its
radius of generalization is changed, on the other, hand MLP IDS’s accuracy increases with
number of iterations. Figure 3.17 show the accuracy of MLP IDS Vs CC4 IDS for increas-
ing number of iterations. The MLP IDS and CC4 IDS where tested with a fixed number of
test inputs with included 4 different attacks types (Smurf , Neptune, Nmap and Satan) and
normal data. The accuracy of CC4 IDS remained the same irrespective of the number of
iterations because CC4 has a one pass training algorithm and is based on prescriptive learn-
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Figure 3.16: Modified Architecture of Hybrid IDS for Detecting and Training IDS for
Unknown Attacks
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ing,whereas MLP IDS’s learns better with every iteration and hence its accuracy increase
with the number of iterations.
Figure 3.17: CC4 IDS vs MLP IDS on Variable Number of Iterations
3.7.2 False positive and false negative comparison of MLP IDS Vs CC4 IDS
MLP IDS shows a very low, close to 0% false positive and false negative rate when it is fully
trained with signatures of known intrusion attack types and with signature of normal type.
The CC4 IDS shows some false negative behavior. Figure 3.18 and figure 3.19 show the
graph of CC4 based IDS and MLP IDS when both where tested with the same dataset. For
better understanding and better comparison we just used one output neuron at the output
layer which will output ’1’ if the input vector belongs to any of the known attack classes
and ’0’ if input the vector belongs to a normal data class of input. MLP IDS gave 0% false
negative and false positive rate whereas CC4 IDS gave 1.515% false negative rate when
tested with the first 183 attack type data and next 80 normal type data.
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Figure 3.18: CC4 IDS False Positive and False Negative rate
Figure 3.19: MLP IDS False Positive and False Negative Rate
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3.7.3 Performance of MLP IDS Vs CC4 IDS for Unknown Attack
Multiple simulation run on MLP IDS showed more false positive rate and even identified a
wrong class of attack for an unknown attack input, for which it had no prior training. The
main purpose of the hybrid system is to avoid this behavior of MLP IDS. The CC4 IDS
on the other hand shows a downfall in its percentage best match graph below the threshold
for any unknown input data, which helps to identify the abnormal behavior of the input
against all known patterns. Both the IDSs can be trained for new attacks by collecting their
signatures and retraining the neural networks. Thus further occurrences to that particular
unknown attack can be detected properly. Figure 3.20 (a) shows percentage best match
graph of CC4 IDS before training for ”Back” attack and figure 3.20 (b) shows graph with
the test dataset shown in table 3.7 after training. Similarly figure 3.21 (a) shows the output
graph of MLP IDS before training for ”Back” attack and figure 3.21 (b) show output graph
with same dataset after training for ”Back” attack. Figure 3.22 shows the mean square error
of the Levenberg-Marquardt training for MLP IDS procedure vs the training epochs for a
two layer feed forward neural network with configuration- {41 10 10 6}. The decrease in
the error was completely satisfactory for intrusion detection.
Record Type Training Set Validation set Test Set
Normal 1000 1000 45
Satan 1000 1000 45
Smurf 1000 1000 45
Back 1000 1000 45
Teardrop 1000 1000 45
Neptune 1000 1000 45
Table 3.8: Distribution of Data Vectors in Different Subsets used for Training, Validation
and Testing Set for MLP IDS and CC4 IDS to Analyze their behavior for an Unknown
Attack
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(a) CC4 IDS Percentage Best Match graph for Unknown Attack before training
(b) CC4 IDS Percentage Best Match graph for Unknown Attack after training
Figure 3.20: Behavior of MLP IDS vs CC4 IDS for Unknown Attack Before Training
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(a) MLP IDS graph for Unknown Attack Before Training
(b) MLP IDS graph for Unknown Attack After Training
Figure 3.21: Behavior of MLP IDS vs CC4 IDS for Unknown Attack After Training
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We have successfully implemented an instantaneous and accurate intrusion detection sys-
tem using a hybrid network architecture and proved that instantaneous intrusion detection
system is very efficient with both known and unknown attack detection. The hybrid sys-
tem uses an anomaly based analysis to identify new attacks which is implemented using the
CC4 algorithm- an instantaneously trained neural network and uses a misuse based analysis
for known attack detection which is implemented using a basic two layered feed forward
network, the MLP neural network tool.
It is observed that the hybrid IDS with three components, the CC4 IDS, two-layer feed-
forward based IDS and the Post Processing Unit work together to increase the accuracy
of intrusion detection. The hybrid intrusion detection system detects not just whether the
input is an attack or a non attack, but its also tells to which class the attack belongs. The
Hybrid system reduces false positive and false negative rates through a well trained two
layered feed forward network IDS. The Hybrid system is capable of instantaneous detec-
tion of unknown attacks, hence the name Instantaneous Intrusion Detection System. The
simulation on the 1998 KDD dataset shows that the instantaneous intrusion detection sys-
tem is capable of real time detection of known and unknown attacks with high accuracy
and low false positive and false negative rates.
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4.2 Summary of Results
In our thesis we present an effective intrusion detection system which can detect normal,
specific attack class as well as unknown attacks, thus improving on current misuse based
intrusion detection system. The results shows the hybrid system is capable of detecting
attack classes with 90-92% accuracy and with less than 3% of false positive and false
negative rate, when two-layer feed-forward neural network based IDS is well trained. The
hybrid system detects new or unknown attack with an accuracy of 80-85%.
4.3 Critique
• The CC4 algorithm requires data to be converted into unary form which requires
extra computation efforts
• The results of both the IDS should be synchronized to analyze the output of both the
IDS in real time scenario.
4.4 Future Work
• The CC4 based IDS requires quantization mapping to convert floating point values
to unary value. A fast classification network was proposed by Kun Won Tang and
Subhash Kak [22] in 2002, which possesses the same generalization characteristics
and fast training speed as that of CC4 neural network and does not require any data
conversions. This could be a replacement to CC4 IDS and may give better results in
terms of detection speed as pre mapping and post output comparisons can be avoided.
• A better data mining approach can be used to get an ideal input vector which contains
fewer attributes than the original input vector, to qualify for all possible attacks class.
• The hybrid system can be implemented and tested with real time network data and
see its performance. A evaluated delay can be added to synchronize the output from
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the respective intrusion detection systems.
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